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Patterns of Credit Card Use Among Low
and Moderate Income Households
Ronald J. Mann *
Ensuring that the poorer segments of the population have access to financial products and
services has taken on increased significance as policymakers have come to understand the broad
social ramifications of inclusive financial regimes. Access not only promotes savings but also
enables the poor to manage cash flows and to meet basic needs such as health care, food, and
housing. In the United States, the last few decades have seen remarkable progress on that front, as
low- and moderate-income (“LMI”) households increasingly use both mainstream products like
deposit accounts1 and “fringe” products like payday lending, check-cashing services, and
pawnshops.2 At the same time, because many of those products exploit cognitive and financial
constraints, policymakers now increasingly move beyond concerns about access to emphasize the
need for safety in the design and marketing of financial products.3
Credit cards cut across those concerns.

With respect to access, the credit card is a

profoundly democratizing instrument. It is only a slight exaggeration to say that any person with a
Visa or MasterCard product can walk into the same stores and restaurants as the most elite trendsetters in our society and purchase the same goods and services, at the same prices. As social status
in our consumer society shifts to depend on consumption rather than wealth or family status, the
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credit card has become the great leveler of social hierarchies.4 The credit card also provides a
remarkably flexible safety net, ready for deployment in response to the most unexpected financial
crises.5 That protection is particularly important in the United States, where the public safety net is
more porous than it is in many of our peer nations.6
At the same time, the credit card is singled out as one of the most perilous consumer
financial products. The prevalence of credit card use raises concerns that consumer spending is
leading to overindebtedness.7

Studies of national aggregate data suggest a significant relation

between increased credit card use and consumer bankruptcy filings.8

The flexibility and

unpredictability that make the credit card so useful for households faced with unexpected difficulties
are central to the danger the product can bring to those who use it recklessly.9 The financial
precariousness of LMI households makes those concerns particularly telling for those concerned
about financial products for the poor.
This chapter uses data from the Federal Reserve Board’s Survey of Consumer Finances for
2004 (the “SCF”) to examine the penetration of credit cards into LMI markets. The chapter has two
purposes. First, I discuss the rise of the modern credit market, emphasizing the segmentation of
product lines based on behavioral and financial characteristics of customer groups.10 Among other
things, that trend involves the use of products aimed at LMI households that differ significantly
from those aimed at middle-class households.
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Second, I describe the extent to which LMI households borrow on credit cards, the types of
LMI households that borrow, and how they differ from the more affluent households that borrow.
Despite lower incomes, credit card use is almost as common among LMI households as it is among
more affluent households. Indeed, measured as a share of income, the credit card balances that LMI
cardholders carry are substantially higher than those of more affluent households. To check the
robustness of those results, the chapter closes with the results of a multivariate regression analysis of
the characteristics of LMI households with credit card debt. Generally, those results suggest that the
demographic characteristics of LMI households that have credit card debt are different in material
ways from the characteristics of those with credit card debt in the overall population. The models
that I summarize here suggest that age, race, and education are important predictors of credit card
use in the population at large. At least in these models, however, age and race become insignificant
and education is only marginally important in predicting credit card use in LMI households. In LMI
households, by contrast, the most significant predictors of credit card use are employment status,
the use of other financial products (checking accounts, mortgage loans, and car loans), and marital
status.

The Modern Credit Card Market
The rise of the credit card to dominance in American payment and lending transactions is
well known. The total value of credit card transactions has increased from about $800 billion in
1990 to more than $1.7 trillion in 2006. Similarly, credit card balances have increased from about
$450 billion in 1990 to more than $750 billion in 2006.11 As Figure 1 illustrates, the rise in spending
on cards reflects a substantial shift toward cards and away from other payment devices.
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What is less widely understood is the mechanism by which this has occurred. Credit card
lending is by its nature risky. Unlike the home mortgage lender or the car lender, the credit card
lender has no collateral to which it can look for repayment. Moreover, several factors combine to
leave the credit card lender with no practical device for collecting payment. First, in most American
jurisdictions unsecured lenders have no practical remedy other than litigation, either because
garnishment is illegal (the rule in some States), or because it is ineffective, especially against debtors
that do not have regular incomes or bank accounts. Most jurisdictions also have schedules of
exempt assets that are not subject to seizures by unsecured creditors, even when they hold unpaid
judgments. Thus, exemptions in many cases will cover all assets in the household. Finally, the
availability of a discharge in bankruptcy means that debtors who are pushed too far normally can
discharge their obligations to the credit card lender.
In truth, the most effective lever the credit card lender has is the threat of damaging the
credit report of the borrower. A credit card debtor that does not pay will suffer a substantially lower
credit rating. Although the lower credit card rating will have only a limited impact on the debtor’s
access to credit card debt, it will substantially increase the cost of subsequent borrowing. This is
particularly true for mortgage lenders, which continue to use crude underwriting systems that rely
directly on the credit rating system. For the sophisticated credit card lender, in contrast, the credit
rating will be at most one of many inputs into the underwriting process. In any event, the threat of
an adverse credit report will be ineffective against debtors in serious financial distress, where the
credit rating already has been compromised because of missed payments to other creditors.
Because of the riskiness of the credit card business model, the industry, in its infancy, used a
unitary business model. The product offerings of the different issuers were similar, so competition
occurred mainly through marketing and customer service. Interest rates were standard and relatively
high, typically in the range of 18%. At the same time, despite those relatively high rates, the
4

customers to whom credit card lenders could make profitable loans were a relatively small slice of
the middle class. The wealthy would have no interest in borrowing at 18% and those without
reliable income streams were too risky. In general, most issuers had a large group of profitable
customers that borrowed and paid substantial amounts of interest, a second group of generally
unprofitable customers that did not borrow, but instead paid their bills each month, and a third
group of highly unprofitable customers that borrowed and did not repay their debts. Profitability
came from maximizing the number of customers in the first group and minimizing the number in
the second and third groups.
The advent of technological underwriting tools in the 1990’s changed everything. The most
capable lenders developed increasingly complex statistical models that predicted more accurately the
spending and repayment behavior of smaller slices of the potential cardholding population. The
result has been a steady segmentation and specialization of the market. The first stage involved
differential pricing, in which low risk customers received lower interest rates (to encourage
borrowing), and in which high risk customers received higher interest rates (to provide a margin for
delinquencies).
Differential pricing has not led to a decline in net interest margins. Although the effective
annual interest rate has fallen in the last fifteen years from about 16.4% in 1990 to 12.2% in 2006,12 a
parallel decrease in the cost of funds means that the net interest margin has not changed
substantially during that period (rising from 7.4% in 1990 to 7.6% in 2005). At the same time,
however, the portfolios underwritten at that margin have become considerably riskier. For example,

The statistics reported in this paragraph are compiled from the annual Cards Profitability Survey
published by Cards & Payments (formerly Cards Management). Figure 2 presents a detailed time series of the
relevant information. Other sources suggest higher borrowing rates at the early end of this period, but I use
the Cards & Payments data because of its consistency and availability over the entire period covered by this
discussion.
12
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the rate at which issuers write off unpaid balances (“chargeoffs”) steadily increased during this
period from 3.5% in 1990 to about 6% during 2004-05.13 Essentially, improved underwriting
technologies allowed the successful credit card lenders to develop reliable predictions about the
repayment behavior of increasingly unreliable customers. This capability has allowed those lenders
to acquire profitable portfolios filled with cardholders that would have been unacceptably risky a few
decades ago.14
The maintenance of a relatively constant net interest margin suggests a balance of increased
borrowing at lower rates by relatively creditworthy customers against new borrowing by relatively
risky customers at higher rates. The ability to profit with flat interest margins despite the increase in
chargeoffs suggests that the card issuers have developed new revenue sources. The first is an
increased reliance on fees, particularly in the subprime product lines discussed below. Late and
overlimit fees on an annual basis were only 0.7% of the average outstanding balances in 1990, but
doubled during the 1990’s to 1.4% or 1.5% of the average outstanding balances, a plateau at which
they remained until they began to decline in 2005 and 2006. The second increased revenue source is
fees paid by merchants that accept cards (“interchange”), which has risen about 70% faster than
receivables, from 2.15% to 3.69% of average outstanding balances. In part, this reflects the ability of
issuers, especially in recent years, to shift increasing numbers of cardholders to high-interchange
premium and “platinum” products.15

There was a sharp fall shortly after the implementation of the Bankruptcy Abuse Prevention and
Consumer Protection Act of 2005 (BAPCPA), to 3.9% for 2006, but the rate trended steadily upward
throughout 2007. It remains unclear whether the decline will be permanent.
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The most detailed evidence of that trend comes from Black & Morgan’s comparison of the
characteristics of credit cardholders in the 1989 and 1995 cross-sectional SCF studies.
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The second stage of market segmentation involves the development of increasingly complex
product attributes that tailor products to specific classes of potential cardholders.16 Thus, different
issuers are particularly expert in superprime offerings (Chase Bank and Bank of America), affinity
offerings (Bank of America’s MBNA division), co-branded offerings (Chase Bank), relational
offerings (Wells Fargo), subprime offerings (Capitol One), and foreign offerings (CitiBank). Each
issuer tailors its products carefully to make them both profitable and attractive, with a different mix
of anticipated revenue streams based on the type of customer. Superprime offerings, for example
attract a portfolio of customers that spend very heavily and borrow occasional primarily for
convenience. Issuers rely heavily on interchange and episodic interest payments, balanced against
the large losses that come when a customer with a five-figure credit line becomes insolvent. Affinity
products (bearing logos of universities, sports teams, or the like) are more likely to balance
interchange against limited payments to sponsors, while co-branded offerings (bearing logos of
airlines or leading retailers) are likely to balance annual fees and interchange against relatively high
payments to sponsors. Relational offerings are part of a strategy in which a bank strives to provide
many products to each customer, with a view to lowering the customer’s price sensitivity on
particular products.
For a study of LMI households, subprime issuers are the most interesting, because they are
the issuers whose products are most likely to be seen commonly in LMI households.17 Not
surprisingly, subprime products rely heavily on interest income and fees. Indeed, a dominant share
of the increase in fee revenue discussed above has come from the subprime market. In part, this

The information in this paragraph is based on strategy analysis in the annual reports of large credit
card issuers.
16

This is not because subprime products are designed for LMI households. Product design depends
much more on stability of income and on past repayment patterns than on the amount of current income.
Subprime products are more likely to appear in LMI households because LMI households are more likely to
have unstable incomes and poor or spotty repayment histories.
17
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reflects the reality that the stated interest rates on those products (often in the range of 18%-24%
per annum) are inadequate to provide a return on a portfolio with a chargeoff rate in the vicinity of
15-20%. Fee revenue provides a simple way to substantially increase the effective interest rate.
Take, for example, a typical subprime $500 credit card line that has been fully extended. If the
cardholder incurs three late or overlimit fees per year (not an unreasonable estimate), the issuer is
likely to get approximately $100 in extra revenue.18 Those fees add an additional 20% return per
year on the credit line, for a total effective rate (assuming no other fees or charges) of about 35%40%.
More aggressive card issuers, targeting customers of greater risk, design products with even
higher effective rates. For example, one popular subprime card19 has a $300 limit and a 20% interest
rate, with $247 in upfront fees ($49 annual fee, $99 account processing fee, $89 program
participation fee, and a $10 monthly maintenance fee). The fees are charged against the card when
the cardholder receives it, leaving an available credit line of $53. If a cardholder makes a $53
purchase on the date the card arrives (thus expending the entire remaining available balance), and
repays the balance in one month, the effective interest rate would be about 5500%. From a
marketing perspective, this card might look attractive because it offers a grace period to cardholders
that pay their balance in the entirety. Nor is that card unique. Another successful product offers a
$250 limit and an interest rate of only 10%, with $178 in upfront fees ($29 account setup fee, $95
program fee, $48 annual fee, $6 participating fee). If that cardholder spends the entire available
credit ($72) on the first day, and repays the balance at the end of the first month, the effective
interest rate would be about 3000%. To be sure, the interest rates would fall if the cardholders took

18
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19 This paragraph describes two cards featured at a leading card comparison Web site as among the
most attractive subprime cards in the fall of 2007.
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longer to repay their balances, but the large share of fees compared to the maximum amount of
available credit ensures that the effective interest rate will remain substantially higher than the stated
interest rate.
Collectively, those market segmentation strategies are highly effective, at least for lenders
that are able to employ cutting-edge technology. Large issuers say privately that only about 25% of
their customers are unprofitable, a substantial improvement from the early 1990’s when about half
of the customers in a typical portfolio would be profitable to the issuer. One final corollary of the
increasing importance of sophisticated underwriting technology is the rapid concentration of the
lending market. Issuers that do not invest heavily in technology quickly fall behind, losing the ability
to compete against those that do. As of 2006 the top five issuers held more than 70% of the
outstanding credit card balances, up from only 39% in 1994.20
The changes in the credit card market raise important questions about the role of credit
cards in the finances of LMI households. It is clear, of course, that a considerable number of LMI
households have held credit cards for some time. For example, the analysis by Edward Bird and his
coauthors of the 1995 SCF cross-sectional study shows that 36% of households below the poverty
line had a credit card and about two-thirds were carrying balances.21 Similarly, Peter Yoo’s analysis
of the SCF cross-sectional studies between 1983 through 1995 show that the share of households
with credit cards and credit card debt has been increasing over time. Most importantly for present
purposes, he shows that the rates of increase vary across deciles of the SCF’s respondent
population.22
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Still, we know relatively little about the extent of borrowing or the characteristics of LMI
households that use credit cards. Existing research shows that credit cards play a different financial
and social role in LMI households than they do in middle-class households. For example, Jeanne
Hogarth and Kevin O’Donnell have studied in some detail the holdings of checking accounts
among LMI households. Their work shows that a significant number (8%) of LMI households that
do not have checking accounts nevertheless have credit cards.23 So, credit cards must present
benefits that extent beyond simple retail transacting.
Angie Littwin’s research is particularly enlightening. Based on interviews with women in
Boston housing projects, Littwin shows how credit cards provide a lifeline that facilitates access to
or lower prices for a variety of mainstream transactions. She explains that the credit card helps LMI
households remain a part of the mainstream economic community.24 At the same time, these
households have a deep-seated recognition of the risks they face if they borrow. Generally, Littwin
suggests, these products would be more attractive to LMI households and also safer for them if they
included a hard-credit line, thus limiting impulsive borrowing.25
Given the rapid changes in the credit market in the last 10 years, it is valuable both to update
the early findings about the initial penetration of credit cards into LMI households and also to
analyze the available data in more detail. For example, scholars have not examined which LMI
households are most likely to hold credit cards or to borrow heavily with them. The segmentation
and proliferation of product models discussed above suggests that the products that will be
attractive to LMI households will function differently than the products that are attractive to the

Hogarth & O’Donnell 1999. This fact seems surprising given the logistical difficulties of making
payments on a credit card account without a checking account.
23
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middle class. Thus, it would be useful to understand who chooses to use those products and how
the choices that LMI households make differ from the parallel choices that more financially secure
households make.
It is not easy to find data to investigate those questions with care. National aggregate data
are useful to understand the conceptual relations among spending, borrowing and financial
distress,26 but are of no use for this inquiry because they do not show how card use varies over the
distribution of income. I decided to look to the 2004 survey of the Survey of Consumer Finances,
conducted by NORC for the Federal Reserve Board. The 2004 survey is based on a complex
sample of U.S. households27 and includes data on income, assets, debt, borrowing, and the
demographic characteristics of respondents.
There are some problems with the use of the SCF for such an inquiry. First, the SCF is not
a panel survey. Rather, investigators draw a different sample of interview subjects (and train a
different set of interviewers) for each edition of the survey. This limits the value of the data for
analyzing trends over time – such as the changes in credit card use since 1990. Another well-known
problem is the tendency of survey respondents to underreport stigmatizing behavior. Credit card
borrowing, for example, is understated by about 30%, at least as compared to the Federal Reserve’s
G-19 statistics (which rely for the most part on call reports submitted by financial institutions to
regulators).28 At first glance, the large underreporting problem seems difficult to overcome, given
the likelihood that the factors that cause the underreporting will create a selection bias in the data.

26

Mann 2006.

The SCF uses a dual sampling technique that includes a probability sample collected in specified
geographic regions and a sample from the tax list provided by the Internal Revenue Service. The resulting
sample oversamples higher wealth groups, but weighting of the data can be used to obtain estimates
applicable to the U.S. population as a whole. Kennickell 2006.
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Jonathan Zinman’s work, however, suggests that the underreporting is random with respect to other
variables – so that the underreporting will affect only the weights of variables rather than the relation
among them.29 Reasonably skeptical observers, however, will worry that use of the SCF to analyze
card-related behavior is a dubious enterprise. This is particularly true for a project that focuses
directly on data known to be substantially underreported. Still, the fact remains that the SCF,
despite its problems, is the best available source for household-level data about national patterns of
card use.30

Patterns of Credit Card Use
Because the purpose of this project is to understand the role that credit card borrowing plays
among LMI households (defined as the bottom two quintiles in the income distribution), I start by
dividing the SCF dataset into five quintiles based on income. The two lowest quintiles (Quintiles 1
and 2 in the analysis below) end at $18,500 and $34,000 of annual income respectively.31 Conversely,
I use three distinct metrics to capture the penetration of credit card lending into LMI households:
the number of households with any credit card debt at all (those carrying a positive balance); the size
of the balances carried by households that are carrying balances (“CCBAL”); and the ratio of the
household’s credit card balance to its income (“CCSHARE”).32

Zinman 2007. Of course, the measures of credit card debt have other problems, particularly the
difficulty of identifying outstanding credit card debt at the time of the interview and the fact that the
outstanding debt at any particular point in time might not be representative of a person’s average credit card
debt. It is plausible to believe, though, that those problems will produce random errors.
29
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The descriptive statistics in this section reflect weighting of the data to compensate for the
oversampling of high-income households, as well as averaging of the five implicates for each household.
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Penetration of the Market
The most basic question about credit card use by LMI households is how often they borrow
on cards, as compared to more affluent households. The answer, in short, is that their usage
patterns are surprisingly similar. The importance of income as the primary source of repayment for
credit card lenders suggests that a group of households defined by low income levels should have
little or no credit card debt. On the contrary, it is startling how similar the borrowing patterns are
for the four lower income quintiles.
I start with the incidence of debt – the share of households that report that they are carrying
any credit card debt at all (46% across the entire dataset). Figure 3 breaks down that data by
quintile. Several things about this figure are interesting. First, as expected it shows the highest rate
of card balances (55%) in the middle-class quintile long considered the principal focus of credit card
lending. The most intriguing feature of the data is the robust rate of borrowing in the two LMI
quintiles. First, the 43% rate of borrowing by households in the moderate-income quintile is very
close to the rates in the higher quintiles. This is a graphic illustration of the broadening of the
traditional credit card demographic discussed above. The data here display a highly similar incidence
of borrowing across the interior three quintiles of the populace – with incomes ranging from
$23,500 (the top of the first quintile) to $90,000 (the bottom of the fifth quintile). To be sure, the
29% incidence of borrowing in the first quintile is considerably lower, but it is somewhat sobering
given the reality that the first quintile consists of households with income below $23,500.
The second metric of credit card borrowing is the size of the balances carried by those
households that are carrying balances. This metric provides considerably more information about
borrowing than the first metric because it displays the intensity and regularity of borrowing. To set
the frame of reference, the median balance for those carrying balances in the entire dataset is $2300,
the 25% balance is $700, and the 75% amount is $6300. Figure 4 displays a series of boxplots by
13

quintile, which show the complete range of the data as well as the 25 percentile, median, and 75
percentile values.33
Like Figure 3, several points about the boxplots in Figure 4 warrant emphasis. The most
notable is the relative stability of balances across the three interior quintiles. To be sure, the
amounts borrowed are staggered by quintile, but the differences are relatively insignificant. Finally,
the level of debt in the first quintile is surprisingly high. Press reports and industry publicity suggest
that credit limits of $500 are typical for low-income households. But these data suggest that most of
the lower-income (first quintile) households that are carrying credit card balances have balances
greater than $1000. Again, combining the importance of income to credit card underwriting with
the limited income of these households, it is quite surprising that the typical balances could be so
high. The most likely explanation is that, even in this quintile, most of the households that are
carrying balances are using more than one card.
The third metric of credit card borrowing is the amount of the credit card balance as a share
of income. For purposes of descriptive comparison, this metric has two advantages over the
preceding metrics. First, given the role that income plays in credit card underwriting, it facilitates
useful cross-quintile comparisons. To compare the extent to which customers in different quintiles
are heavy borrowers, it is more useful to know what share of customers are borrowing a tenth of
their annual income than it is to know what share of customers are borrowing $5000. Related to the
first, the ratio of credit-card debt to income provides a useful tool for examining overindebtedness.
Thus, Edward Bird and his co-authors use this metric to identify customers who have borrowed
excessively.34
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The boxplots in Figure 5 underscore the analysis above. Again, the differences among the
three interior quartiles are relatively slight, with typical debt loads of about one-twentieth of a
customer’s annual income. Again, this suggests a relatively homogeneous willingness to take and use
credit cards within these quintiles. For another, the charts show an interesting and steady decline on
each of the measurement points (25%, median, 75%). Thus, when we use this metric, we can see
that respondents in the first quintile in fact borrow more intensively than respondents in the higher
quintiles. The median borrowing share of about one-twelfth of annual income is higher than the
median for the other quintiles. Half of the respondents have debt equal to a month’s income, and a
quarter of the respondents have debt equal to two months income. Moreover, the long right tail of
borrowing share in that quintile suggests that creditors routinely write relatively extensive credit lines
for people in this group.

Demographic Factors
Knowing that credit cards have become a common product for LMI households tells us
little about who uses them, or, more importantly, whether the factors that relate to use by LMI
households are the same as those that relate to use by the populace more broadly. For purposes of
this study, I have chosen to examine five sets of demographic variables from the SCF: age,
educational level, family status, race, and use of other financial products. My goals for this analysis
are modest. I do not believe, for example, that a model based on these variables can reliably predict
the level of credit card use. The models that credit card issuers use to predict card-related behavior
are much more sophisticated, including dozens of variables for each potential cardholder. These
variables are related not only to demographic factors like the ones included here, but more
importantly to indicators of financial activity and creditworthiness that are not easily replicated in a
survey like the SCF. To put it another way, the most important variables issuers use to identify the
persons to whom they will extend credit (and the terms on which they will extend it) are missing
15

from this dataset. The absence of those variables necessarily limits the quality of the potential
models. Even more importantly, those factors cannot predict either the demand for credit cards or
individual preferences and behaviors regarding borrowing and credit card use.
Nevertheless, we learn two things from investigating the demographic characteristics of
credit card users. First, the model illuminates the social role of credit cards by contributing to an
understanding of demographic differences between those that borrow and those that do not.
Second, the model provides indirect evidence regarding to the hypothesis that the business models
for the products that are marketed to LMI households differ substantially from those offered to
more affluent households. If the factors that distinguish those that do and do not borrow (or
among those that borrow) vary across quintiles, we might infer that the products being sold to
customers in those quintiles differ in substantial ways. I analyze those variables in two steps. First, I
present pairwise data comparing each of these variables to metrics of credit card use.35 Second, I
close the paper by presenting the results of efforts to create models fitting those demographic
variables to the various credit card metrics discussed above.
Age
At least in the univariate analysis, the relation between age and credit card borrowing is
relatively straightforward. On the one hand, to the extent cardholders use credit card borrowing to
smooth consumption over their lifecycle, we should see more borrowing by relatively young
cardholders and less borrowing by relatively old cardholders. As for the relation between this age
effect and LMI households, we might expect that young cardholders in LMI quintiles would need to

The demographic and regression analyses in this section examine only the existence of credit card
debt and the amount of credit card debt. Because the relation between credit card balance and income relates
directly to income, it is not useful to use it in regression models in which income will be one of the control
variables.
35
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borrow more frequently than young cardholders in more affluent households. Similarly, we might
expect that cardholders in LMI households would be less likely to repay their debts and thus more
likely to continue borrowing into middle and old age.
In general, the univariate data support that simple understanding of the relations among age,
credit card debt, and income quintile. Table 1 shows the results of simple pairwise correlations
between age and the existence of credit card debt. The coefficients are negative for each quintile,
and in each case significant at the 0.01% level. Thus, the coefficients suggest that in each quintile
people with credit card debt tend to be younger than those without credit card debt. Finally, the
coefficient is weakest in the first quintile (where the credit card is least likely to be used for
consumption smoothing) and strongest in the fourth quintile, where consumption smoothing is
most likely. Figure 6 illustrates the distinction graphically, showing a gap between the mean ages of
those who do borrow and those who do not, with the widest gap in the fourth quintile.
Educational Level
The relation between education and credit card borrowing is considerably harder to predict,
primarily because it is difficult to be certain whether that increased financial sophistication would
lead to a greater or lower incidence of credit card debt. Similarly, it is possible that education would
have a different relation to credit card borrowing at different levels of affluence. Among LMI
households, for example, it might be that only the relatively well-educated would be in a position to
obtain a credit card, while in more affluent households (where educational levels are likely to be
higher across the board) credit cards might be readily available even to the relatively less educated.
The correlations between educational level and credit card borrowing do little to dispel the
ambiguity of the relationship suggested above. For the first four quintiles the coefficients steadily
fall from a strongly positive coefficient in the first quintile to a strongly negative coefficient in the
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fourth quartile. There is no significant difference in the fifth quintile, apparently because there is
relatively little variation in education. As illustrated graphically in Figure 7, the level of education
steadily increases by quintile, but the credit card borrowers in the first two quintiles are the relatively
more educated, while they are the relatively less educated in the third and fourth quintiles.
Family Status
The next demographic variables are family status variables – specifically whether the head of
the household is married and whether there are children in the household. As with educational
level, it is easy to discern conflicting possible relations. On the one hand, married families and those
with children might be more stable, and thus less likely to need credit card borrowing. On the other
hand, the greater level of stability and higher level of consumption might make them more attractive
customers. Interestingly, the data suggest that having children and being married have different
effects on the likelihood of credit card borrowing. As Figure 8 illustrates, having children correlates
with having credit card debt, and the correlation is significant both overall and at each of the five
quintiles. Figure 9, on the other hand, illustrates the more nuanced effect of marriage – the married
who are in the two LMI quintiles are less likely to borrow on credit cards. Households with a
married head of household in the more affluent quintiles, by contrast are more likely to borrow.
Race
The effects of race on credit card borrowing are most difficult to predict because of two
directly conflicting intuitions. On the one hand, if markets function rationally, race would not be a
useful predictor of either creditworthiness or financial behavior. On the other hand, if the effects of
discrimination are present in lending or borrowing markets, or if race correlates substantially with
important variables that are missing from this dataset, then we would find correlations between race
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and credit card behavior. The data in Table 1 suggest that whites are less likely to borrow on credit
cards than blacks and Hispanics.
On the other hand, as the lower rows of that table illustrate, the significant correlation with
race appears only in the more affluent quintiles; there are no significant correlations between race
and the incidence of credit card debt in the LMI quintiles. The pattern is apparent in Figure 10. In
the first two quintiles, all races have approximately the same incidence of credit card debt. But in
the more affluent quintiles, blacks and Hispanics are much more likely to be carrying credit card
debt.
Use of Other Financial Products
The last variable is the household’s use of other financial products. This is not, strictly
speaking, a demographic variable, but it seems important to include it in the model because it
provides a valuable proxy for financial sophistication. If we think families are more likely to borrow
on credit cards if they previous experience with other banking products, then we should expect a
positive relation between having a checking account and carrying a credit card balance. The last
column of Table 1 shows correlations between the most widely used of the other products (the
checking account), which provide some support for that hypothesis, concentrated at the lowerincome quintiles, apparently because almost all households in the more affluent quintiles have
checking accounts.

Multivariate Analysis
Given the large number of variables that exhibit pairwise association, multivariate analysis is
necessary to test the robustness of the associations. As explained above, it would be surprising if the
variables in the SCF dataset explained most of the pattern of credit card borrowing. Credit card
lenders rely on proprietary statistical models that aggregate dozens of variables from numerous
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sources, many of which are not in the public domain much less in the SCF.36 Similarly, a model that
predicts consumer behavior and preferences would include many variables beyond the
straightforward demographic variables and financial sophistication variables used here.
Model for the Entire Dataset
The first step was to estimate models for the entire dataset. I estimate a logistic model for
the binary credit card variable (whether the household has credit card debt) and an ordinary least
squares model for the credit card balances variable (logged because of the skewness of the data).
The function for the linear model is:
LogCCBAL = β0 + β1age + β2agesq + β3education + β4black + β5hispanic + β6logincome +
β7incomeshock + β8empl + β9checking + β10vehicle + β11mortgage + β12married + β13children +
β14educlogincome + β15blacklogincome + β13hispaniclogincome +u
I use the RII method to reflect the multiple implicates for each household in the SCF dataset.
Because of the controversy regarding the propriety (or necessity) of using weighting in regressions
from the SCF dataset, I report alternate runs with and without weighting.37 I separately tested firstorder interactions among all of the independent variables and retained in the model the interactive
variables that were economically and statistically significant in any of the models. As summarized in
Columns 1 and 2 of Tables 2 and 3, the results of the multivariate analysis are substantially different
from the results suggested by the univariate descriptions in the preceding section.

Credit card lenders rely heavily, for example, on information about past spending and repayment
patterns, much of which is far more detailed than the information available from credit reporting agencies.
The information is proprietary, in part, because of its competitive value. The issuer familiar with years of
spending, borrowing, and repayment history has a considerable advantage in designing and pricing products
over an issuer that has never had a relationship with the cardholder. Among other things, consumers face
high switching costs when competing issuers are less well placed to extend credit than their existing card
issuer. This contributes, in turn, to the ability of issuers to charge higher prices to LMI customers (and other
customers in distress).
36

37

Lindamood et al. 2007.
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Turning first to the demographic variables, although age was inversely correlated to debt in
the univariate analysis presented above, the multivariate analysis suggests that the effect of age is
much more ambiguous, with an inverse relation to the existence of debt and a positive relation to
the amount of debt).38 Similarly, blacks and Hispanics (more likely to have credit card debt in the
univariate analysis) appear in the multivariate analysis only marginally more likely to have credit card
debt, but at the same time significantly likely to have much less of it (at least in the unweighted
models).39 Income is inversely related to the existence of debt (because those at higher income
levels are less likely to have debt), but positively related to the amount of debt. Similarly, education
has little or no relation to the existence of debt but has a strong positive relation to the amount of
debt. Finally, marital status and the existence of children are unimportant in the multivariate model,
presumably because the other variables in the model data regarding age, education, and race capture
the features of households most likely to relate to credit card borrowing.
I also use a series of financial controls that collectively indicate the creditworthiness and
financial sophistication of the household: employment, having a checking account, car loan, or
mortgage loan).40 Not surprisingly, all of these variables relate positively to the existence and
amount of credit card debt and all are significant at the 1% level.41

Because the effect of age appears to be nonlinear, the OLS model includes agesquared and a
number of interactive variables.
38

39 Significant positive coefficients on black*logincome and hisp*logincome suggest that the effects of
increasing income to increase credit card debt are more pronounced for blacks and Hispanics than they are
for Caucasians.

The variables for having a vehicle or mortgage loan likely measure creditworthiness, because the
standards for underwriting those loans are somewhat more rigorous, even recognizing the secured nature of
those loans. But, they also measure a tolerance for borrowing and a willingness to use financial products and
services. The ambiguity in the measure, thus, makes it somewhat difficult to interpret the results.
Nevertheless, using those measures permits a more nuanced analysis of credit card borrowing and lending
practices.
41 Four interactive variables indicate that the effects of other variables are related to income. First,
the interactions with race are discussed in footnote 39. Second, significant negative coefficients on
40
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I also tested an “income shock” variable, which indicates whether the household’s current
income is 25% less than the household’s “normal” income as described in survey responses. If
credit card borrowing compensates for a shock to the household’s income, this variable should
relate positively to credit card borrowing. If income shock causes households to borrow less, and
thus pay down their obligations, this variable should relate negatively to credit card borrowing.
Somewhat to my surprise, the variable has a negative coefficient in all four models, and is related to
the existence of debt at the 1% level, albeit only in the unweighted model.
Model for the Two LMI Quintiles
Finally, I estimated the same models for the two LMI quintiles.42 To ease comparison
between the overall dataset and the LMI quintiles, Table 2 reports all four of the models regarding
the existence of credit card debt (with the results for LMI households in Columns 3 and 4); Table 3
reports all four of the models regarding the amount of credit card debt (with the results for LMI
households in Columns 3 and 4).
The principal difference between the two sets of models is that the demographic variables
are much less important in the LMI model. For example, race, children, and income are wholly
insignificant in those models. The only demographic variable with a robust relation in this model is
age, which has a strong positive relation to the amount of credit card debt in LMI households
(thought not to the existence of debt). Education now has a weakly positive relation on both the

educ*logincome suggest that the positive effects of increasing income and education are mitigated when both
income and education increase. Finally, marginally significant coefficients on logincome*incomeshock
suggest that the negative effects of the income shock variable on credit card debt are mitigated at higher levels
of income.
I also estimated separate models for each of those two quintiles. Although the magnitude of most
of the coefficients in those models was similar, it was more difficult to discern significant relations because of
the smaller sample size.
42
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existence and amount of debt, and marital status has a significant positive relation in the unweighted
models (although not in the weighted models).
Conversely all of the financial variables (employment, checking accounts, car loan, and
mortgage loan) remain significant at the 1% level across all specifications. Interestingly, this suggests
that even at the lowest levels, the amount of income is much less relevant to credit card lending than
the reliability of the income (as evidenced by employment). The most apparent explanation of the
strong effects for the other financial products variables is that the model reflects a “taste” for
financial products: households that are integrated into the financial institutions of society (as
evidenced by their use of one of those products) are much more likely to be using other products as
well.
Finally, the income shock variable is much less important in the LMI quintiles than in the
overall model. This suggests, interestingly enough, that the level and existence of credit card debt
for the lower quintiles is relatively unaffected either by income or by changes in income level. It is
not clear what to make of this finding. One possibility of course is that the dataset is too small or
has insufficient variation to reveal a relation that in fact exists. Another possibility, as with the
findings related to financial products, is a “taste” for financial products, which leaves the choice to
use credit card debt unrelated to income shocks.43

Conclusion
This chapter provides a glimpse of the role that credit cards play in the financial life of LMI
households. Most obviously, the data show that credit cards are now a major part of the economic
life of the poorest U.S. households. Indeed, at least as a share of income, the credit card debt that

43

None of the interactive variables are significant in the LMI models.
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LMI households carry is higher than that of more affluent households. The data also illustrate the
patterns by which credit card borrowing is distributed based on age, race, and other demographic
factors.
The statistical analysis of demographic characteristics of borrowers is intended to be
suggestive, with a view to showing how rational lenders that specialize in different markets would
target entirely different groups of customers. The variations in correlation and association by
quintile provide strong evidence of the reasons why sophisticated issuers should design and market
different products to households at different income levels. The data do not, however, provide
reliable information on the actual factors that credit card issuers use to underwrite their loans.
Moreover, data limitations aside, the absence of panel data means that the SCF simply cannot
provide the temporal evidence useful for examining causal effects. Given the difficulties of using
surveys to collect panel data on that question, the best source for research of that nature likely would
be data from the portfolio of a major credit card issuer.
Returning to the focus on access and safety with which the chapter began, the data provide
stark evidence about the high incidence and level of debt among the poorest families. Looking at
the lowest quintile alone – with income below $23,000 – 31% of the households are carrying credit
card debt. Among those that carry credit card debt, half have debt equal to 10% of their income
and a quarter have debt equal to 25% of their income (all before making mortgage payments, car
payments, child support payments and the like). As I discuss, the process of repaying that debt
typically will involve high interest rates and considerable fees. By comparison, among the middle
class borrowers who are so widely bemoaned for their rampant spending and overindebtedness, the
median debt share is only 5% and only a quarter have debt that exceeds 10% of their incomes. By
any yardstick, we must acknowledge that credit card use among poor households has created a debt
overhang that many households will bear for years, if not decades.
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Appendix

Figure 1 – Spending on Retail Payment Systems (U.S.)
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Figure 2 – Cards Profitability Data
(Percentages of Outstanding Receivables)
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Figure 3: Percent of Households Holding Credit Card Balances

Figure 4: Credit Card Balances (by Quintile)
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Figure 5: Credit Card Balance as a Share of Income (by Quintile)
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Figure 6: Mean Age and Credit Card Debt (by Quintile)

Figure 7: Mean Education and Credit Card Debt (by Quintile)
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Figure 8: Children in the Household and Credit Card Debt

Figure 9: Marital Status and Credit Card Debt
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Figure 10: Credit Card Debt (by Race and Quintile)

Figure 11: Credit Card Debt and Other Financial Products
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Table 1: Correlations between Demographic Variables

and Borrowing on Credit Cards
Married Children

Cauc.

Black Hisp Checking
Account
.01
.005
.16***

Quintile

Age

Educ.

Overall

-.17***

.09***

-.09***

.15***

-.004

1

-.10**

.19***

.03

.05

.001

.01

-.03

.20***

2

-.17***

.14***

.08*

..05

-.02

.02

-.01

.16***

3

-.16***

.003

-.04

.19***

-.03

-.02

.07*

.06

4

-.26***

-.09**

-.12***

.20***

-.05

.07

.05*

.03

5

-.17*** -.17***

-.06

.11***

-.12*** .13*** .1***

-.01

* - 5% ** - 1% *** - .1%
The table reports correlations with the binary variable for the existence of credit card debt. Thus,
positive correlations suggest that the characteristic is positively related to borrowing on credit cards;
negative correlations suggest the converse.
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Table 2 – Logistic Regression Models for Households Holding Credit Card Debt
(1)
(2)
All
All Weighted
age
0.989***
0.992***
(0.003)
(0.003)
educ
0.973*
0.994
(0.015)
(0.016)
black
1.305**
1.359**
(0.119)
(0.122)
hisp
1.349**
1.269*
(0.134)
(0.140)
logincome
0.717***
0.905***
(0.039)
(0.036)
incomeshock
0.743***
0.895
(0.115)
(0.128)
empl
1.696***
1.714***
(0.107)
(0.115)
chk
3.770***
3.019***
(0.159)
(0.156)
vehlbin
2.596***
2.382***
(0.074)
(0.083)
mortbin
2.036***
1.954***
(0.075)
(0.086)
married
1.050
1.059
(0.090)
(0.092)
kidsbin
1.124
1.163*
(0.076)
(0.086)
Pseudo R2
0.145
0.111
Observations
4519
4519
Table reports odds ratios with standard errors in parentheses
* significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%
Adjusted R-squared calculated based on first implicates.
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(3)
LMI
0.995
(0.004)
1.068***
(0.025)
1.052
(0.168)
1.331
(0.205)
1.062
(0.053)
0.862
(0.155)
1.636***
(0.161)
2.573***
(0.177)
2.356***
(0.149)
2.010***
(0.150)
1.305*
(0.140)
1.035
(0.142)
0.107
1359

(4)
LMI Weighted
0.995
(0.004)
1.078***
(0.026)
1.192
(0.181)
1.303
(0.211)
1.020
(0.053)
0.878
(0.167)
1.751***
(0.168)
2.627***
(0.181)
2.380***
(0.156)
2.143***
(0.161)
1.172
(0.150)
1.061
(0.149)
.116
1359

Table 3 – OLS Regression Models for the Level of Credit Card Balances

age
agesquared
educ
black
hisp
logincome
incomeshock
empl
chk
vehlbin
mortbin
married
kidsbin
educlogincome
blacklogincome
hisplogincome
Constant
R2
Observations

(1)
All
0.068***
(0.019)
-0.001***
(0.000)
0.809***
(0.129)
-3.430***
(1.031)
-4.699***
(1.576)
0.718***
(0.185)
-0.234
(0.176)
0.664***
(0.146)
1.546***
(0.193)
1.586***
(0.132)
1.002***
(0.119)
0.138
(0.131)
0.143
(0.121)
-0.078***
(0.012)
0.360***
(0.101)
0.504***
(0.151)
-8.433***
(2.031)
0.188
4519

(2)
All Weighted
0.081***
(0.021)
-0.001***
(0.000)
1.147***
(0.189)
-1.649
(1.112)
-3.470*
(1.913)
1.313***
(0.272)
-0.070
(0.212)
0.758***
(0.188)
1.416***
(0.203)
1.523***
(0.148)
1.228***
(0.152)
0.105
(0.153)
0.237
(0.147)
-0.110***
(0.018)
0.192*
(0.110)
0.378**
(0.186)
-14.907***
(2.823)
0.167
4519

(3)
LMI
0.082***
(0.026)
-0.001***
(0.000)
0.241
(0.264)
1.158
(1.412)
-0.837
(1.968)
0.321
(0.392)
-0.088
(0.231)
0.674***
(0.234)
1.358***
(0.219)
1.305***
(0.248)
1.137***
(0.257)
0.372*
(0.207)
-0.098
(0.211)
-0.015
(0.028)
-0.127
(0.149)
0.124
(0.210)
-5.831
(3.824)
0.140
1359

Standard errors in parentheses
Pseudo R2 calculated based on first implicates.
* significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%
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(4)
LMI Weighted
0.077***
(0.026)
-0.001***
(0.000)
0.451*
(0.267)
0.837
(1.400)
-0.756
(2.046)
0.513
(0.403)
-0.073
(0.249)
0.807***
(0.249)
1.368***
(0.221)
1.285***
(0.256)
1.214***
(0.268)
0.228
(0.220)
0.002
(0.222)
-0.036
(0.028)
-0.074
(0.149)
0.108
(0.217)
-7.572*
(3.920)
0.151
1359

